Procedural aspects:

1.    From the very beginning, the proposal to hold a special session of the Commission on Human Rights was legally defective for the following reason:

• The Security Council has been fully seized with the situation in East Timor since the beginning of the process to resolve the issue.,
• Article 12 of the UN Charter states that: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.  ",.
• No requests were made by the Security Council to the General Assembly, including its subsidiary bodies, such as the Commission on Human Rights, to consider the issue.

3 .    The initiative of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to ascertain the validity of the Rwandan response through a "second" vote, was clearly to make sure that the simple majority was to be achieved, it thus amounted to changing the existing Rules of Procedure.

4.    It is a widely shared view that the Office of the High Commissioner during the process of consultations lacked of impartiality and transparency.

5.    The holding of a special session of the Commission on Human Rights has shown in the past that it can be unproductive has proved by the previous special sessions held for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  The record shows that these two issues were settled in fora other than the Commission on Human Rights.  In fact, there were no improvements in the human rights situations in Yugoslavia and Rwanda until the political and security problems were resolved.

Substantive aspects:

6.    The unfortunate events which have developed in East Timor should be seen in the broader context of the entire process towards the comprehensive settlement of the issue of East Timor, in accordance with the New York Agreement.  The post-ballot acts of violence resulted from the pro-autonomy groups' dissatisfaction with what they viewed as an unfair conduct of the popular consultation.

7.    The Indonesian Government has stated its strong commitment to the full implementation of the New York Agreement of 5 May 1999, and to accept and respect the result of the popular consultation and to uphold its responsibility to maintain security, law and order in the territory.

8.    The Indonesian Government has done its utmost to fulfil its responsibility under the New York Agreement but seeing that the situation got out of hand, the Government decided to declare martial law in the territory as of midnight Tuesday, 7 September 1999, and send reinforcement troops to the province.  It is worth noting that the decision to impose martial law in East Timor was made in consultation with the UN Secretary-General, the Portuguese Government and the UN Security Council.

9.    However, the Government admitted its limited capacity to control the situation in the region and on 12 September, President B.J. Habibie decided to accept the help of a UN peace- keeping Force, in cooperation with the Indonesian Armed Forces, to restore peace and security, to protect the people and alleviate their sufferings as well as to implement the result of the 30 August popular consultation.

10.    The international Force for East Timor (INTERFET) established pursuant to Security Resolution 1264 of 15 September 1999, has now arrived in the province.  Upon arrival the INTERFET has received what they called a "first-class" cooperation from the Indonesian Armed Forces.

11.    A process for the establishment of a National Commission of Enquiry led by the National Commission on Human Rights has been completed with a view to investigating the various reports of human rights abuses in East Timor and bring to justice those responsible for the violations.

12.    On the issue of the East Timorese internally displaced persons (IDPs), the Indonesian Government has set up centres for crisis management to deal with the resettlement and sheltering of IDPs under the auspices of the Coordinator Minister for Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation in coordination with UNDP.  The UNHCR and other UN humanitarian bodies have been given full access to carry out their operations in cooperation with the relevant government agencies.  The Indonesian Government also welcomes the resuming of ICRC's operations in the province.

13.    The outcome of the Special Session must recognized the positive steps taken by the Indonesian Government in addressing the situation and concretely help improve, and not worsen, the situation on the ground.  Indonesia will therefore reject any outcome which would not lead towards this end.