Disarmament Bodies

9th mAY 2003	"National Report on NWFZ in the Middle East"
9th mAY  2003	"National Report on Implementation of Article VI"
9th mAY   2003	"PrepCom II - NPT 2005 Review Conference - Adoption of the Report"

8th April  2003

"PrepCom II - NPT 2005 Review Conference - Peaceful Use"

6th mAY  2003	"PrepCom II-NPT 2005 Review Conference-Cluster 2"
2nd  mAY 2003	"Nuclear Weapons Free Zone In The Region of the Middle East"
2nd mAY  2003	"Negative Security Assurances"
1th mAY   2003	"PrepCom II - NPT 2005 Review Conference - Cluster I"

29th April  2003

"PrepCom II - NPT 2005 Review Conference - General Debate"

[Home] [Statements]

(Geneva, 9^th May 2003)

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(Geneva, 9^th May 2003)

The Islamic Republic of Iran, in implementation of paragraph 15(12) of Article VI Chapter of the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, reports on the measures it has taken to implement Article VI and Paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for non-proliferation and Disarmament”.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that reporting, as envisaged in the step 12 of the thirteen steps, provides an essential element to ascertain the implementation of obligations assumed under article VI of the NPT. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that the objectivity of our analysis on the progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament would be best served through adoption of a format properly defining categories of information required within the strengthening review process.

Iran has been a party to the NPT since 1970, well before its entry into force, and this clearly demonstrates our long-standing support and commitment as a non-nuclear weapon state to this fundamental instrument. During the past three decades, Iran has done its utmost to achieve the objectives and purposes of the Treaty. In 1995, the Islamic Republic of Iran actively participated in the Review and Extension Conference and joined others in supporting the indefinite extension of the Treaty with the hope that the agreed package would pave the way for the early elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all provisions of the NPT. Iran’s position, of denouncing the nuclear option, as a matter of principle, and placing its peaceful nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguard agreement, is a clear manifestation of our commitment to a strong NPT. Iran considers the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine. They do not add to Iran’s security nor do they help rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in Iran’s supreme interests.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all provisions of the NPT are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the “rights and obligations” enshrined in the treaty, preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages both NPT’s universality and its full implementation.

In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Nuclear Weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The thirteen practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, as agreed in the 2000 Review Conference, should be vigorously pursued by Nuclear Weapons States. Therefore, no actions shall be made by any state, in particular Nuclear Weapon States, in contravention of those obligations. Regrettably, the emergence of a new nuclear doctrine, setting rationale for the possible use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States, in the security policy of the United States, is a flagrant violation of the commitments made by the Nuclear Weapon States in the 2000 Review Conference.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has actively participated in international efforts promoting nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation. The initiatives taken towards this noble goal have always enjoyed our full support. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran voted in favour of the Resolutions entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world” (57/59), “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (57/78) and “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (57/94) in the UNGA and other relevant resolutions adopted in the United Nations and other international fora.

In line with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Republic of Iran has, in various forums including before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), made its position clear that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law and, is therefore illegal. As the ICJ stipulated in its advisory opinion in 1996 “there exists an obligation to pursue, in good faith, and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”. The Islamic Republic of Iran has continuously supported the Resolution adopted annually since 1999 entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question of the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”.

Iran considers the early establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament, with a mandate to negotiate nuclear disarmament, to be a concrete step relating to the materialization of nuclear disarmament.

The Islamic Republic of Iran played a prominent role during the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, hoping that the conclusion of the CTBT would prevent the qualitative as well as quantitative development of nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran has signed the CTBT, is an active member of the Preparatory Commission and hosts five International Monitoring System (IMS) stations.

Due to the significant role that the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones plays in achieving a world entirely free from nuclear weapons, in 1974 Iran initiated the Resolution for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. Since 1980, this Resolution has been adopted annually by consensus in the UNGA. However, Israel, through its persistent rejection of accession to any international disarmament instrument, and in particular NPT, remains the main obstacle for the establishment of such a zone.

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Statement by 

Director General for International Political Affairs

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

on

Adoption of the Report

 (Geneva, 9^th  May 2003)

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished Delegates,

NPT and its safeguards regime continue to be our hope for not only nuclear disarmament, but also of preventing the spread of this weapon. We have made very little, if any, headway in the former, but our treaty has had considerable success in the latter, that is, preventing proliferation of nuclear weapon over a span of thirty-three tumultuous years. A strong NPT and safeguards regime benefit us all in terms of preserving the human race. The NPT will be strong only when it is fully complied with by both the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike – when we regard the Treaty as an integrated whole and attach importance to all its provisions and avoid the temptation of picking what suits us at a particular juncture.

The debates over the last two weeks adequately focused on the obligations of the nuclear weapon states. In other words, serious concerns were expressed by many about non-compliance of nuclear weapon states with their unequivocal undertaking under the NPT and other relevant documents. Therefore, I do not intend to dwell on this point any further.

The Islamic Republic of Iran views its commitment under NPT and safeguards regime very seriously. Iran has renounced the nuclear option for many reasons; NPT commitment is only one reason. On the basis of our fundamental principles, we consider the use of nuclear weapon to be inhuman, immoral and illegal. Furthermore, as stated before, we do not believe, that in this day and age, nuclear weapons add to our aggregate security, and as such it has no place in our defense doctrine. Our strength, we believe, lies not in our offensive capability, but in the veracity of our words and deeds, in the cohesiveness of our nation, in our burgeoning and home-grown democracy, public participation in our public life, in our desire and effort to become economically strong and be able to distribute prosperity, where we are not dependent only on the revenue from the sale of oil as a raw material.

Mr. Chairman,

Over the course of our deliberations during this PrepCom a number of delegations raised some questions about the nuclear program in my country. It is our responsibility to respond to them and to allay concern. The more appropriate venue to raise questions and receive responses and engage in verification process is, therefore, the IAEA. We are determined, because we do not have anything to hide, to work closely with the IAEA in a cooperative and transparent manner to make the truth about the peaceful nature of our nuclear program known to all. This, however, is easier said than done. Challenges we face are twofold and they are interrelated. On the one hand, our historical experience of the past two decades marked by eight years of war and constant foreign pressure has dictated a mentality of mistrust and caution in Iran. The other challenge which is mutually reinforcing with the first challenge is, in our view, the inability or unwillingness of the United States to view Iran's peaceful nuclear program objectively, that is to say, separate from problems that our bilateral relations has gone through. This is wrong and could potentially overshadow the IAEA process.

Here are my reasons for my contention:

Delegations that spoke on Iran registered their concern about Iran’s nuclear program and called on Iran for greater transparency, confidence building measures and signing the additional protocol strengthening comprehensive safeguards. At the same time, they refrained from judging the outcome of the IAEA verification until June. However, unlike the US delegation, others who spoke on Iran thought there was no need to register a point five or six times in a NPT PrepCom. Frankly speaking, I could not bring myself to listening and reading more than the first three.

The United States devoted nearly half of five different written interventions to Iran’s nuclear program. Some may argue that this was a US tactic to divert attention from criticism of US failure to comply fully with its own commitments under the NPT. However, I believe there is more to it. There is more to it because it clearly illustrates the US policy of double standard on this issue. Compare US approach to Israel as a proven and established proliferator with its approach to Iran as a country that US suspects it may have not fully complied with its NPT and safeguards obligations. This is far from being fair and as such US statements on Iran’s nuclear program should be taken with a pinch of salt. I believe there is more to the US attempt to create a quasi- crisis about Iran’s program in this PrepCom, particularly because US statements are wrought with prejudgments and derogatory or qualifying terms that cannot be proven. Take, for example the following phrases from the statement by US Assistant Secretary John Wolf:

“…Iran’s pattern to date of denial and deception”

“…Iran is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq.”

“…genuine commitment, true transparency and… genuine confidence”

Or take the following phrases from US Deputy Assistant Secretary Andrew Semmel:

“Iran’s newly revealed nuclear facilities make sense only as a means to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.”

“We urge Iran to verifiably turn away from nuclear weapons…”

He also refers to countries that US considers as sponsor of terrorism and concludes that they compound US concerns.

Or take what the US delegate said a few minutes ago “Iran flouts its NPT obligations.” I wish to recall the exchanges I had with the Ambassador of Luxembourg yesterday referring to the statement by H.E. Mr. Aghazadeh who may have been misquoted as Iran’s putting conditions for accepting the Additional Protocol. I explained yesterday that condition may not be the right word, but in light of prejudicial statement by the United States as I quoted would illustrate the dilemma that Iran faces in connection with the additional protocol. What is the relationship between accepting the Additional Protocol and this line of prejudgments.

These statements illustrate a prejudgment on the part of the United States before the findings of the IAEA is made clear. They are not constructive in terms of the letter and spirit of the NPT -- for they unduly interfere in the IAEA process of verification and inspection. They clearly point to the fact that the US views Iran’s nuclear program from the prism of bilateral relations that has a backdrop of more than twenty years of divergence, to say the least.

We advise against this. We believe Iran’s nuclear program should be viewed on its own merit without political burden of US-Iran bilateral relations.

Despite the evidence I provided from US statements in this PrepCom to the contrary, I would very much like to take Mr. Wolf’s statement at face value, where he said: “this is not a bilateral issue between Iran and the United States.” My delegation welcomes this statement and hopes the United States would keep its word and avoid mixing the two, next time when the same issue is considered.

But this time we worked and deliberated the issue under an environment unduly created by some, particularly the US delegation. The Chairman's summary should be viewed in that light. The Chair and some interested delegations are well aware of our position with regard to Paragraph 34. We believe it is a prejudgment, at this time, to begin name calling before the report of the IAEA is out. However, this being the Chairman's Summary, on his personal responsibility and not a negotiated text, to be attached to the Report of the PrepCom, and in the spirit of responsibility, confidence building, and greater transparency my delegation decided against challenging it.

It is in the same spirit that my delegation participated in this PrepCom and tried to strengthen the review process and move it forward. My delegation has attempted to expound our commitment to our Treaty obligations. We take the questions raised about our peaceful nuclear program in this PrepCom seriously. These questions will be studied by our specialists and we will attempt to respond to them in due time and course. Of course our Vice-President has elaborated on a number of questions that were also raised here. A copy of his statement on 6 May 2003 at the headquarters of the IAEA is available for interested delegations to consult. This opening statement was followed by a period of questions and answers which I hope interested delegations will be informed about them through their delegations at the IAEA. This is not one single shot, but a process we are committed to continue.

At the same time we are eager to get answers about those questions raised by my delegation and others on the implementation of other Articles of the Treaty, specifically those raised on Article VI and the real progress achieved on implementation of the thirteen steps adopted by consensus in the NPT 2000 Review Conference.

Now I wish to make an observation of paragraph 25. The establishment of the nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East is the legitimate call of the states of the region. The establishment of such a zone in the region is a disarmament step and a constructive confidence building measure which would definitely help to promote peace and security in the region. It is also an end in itself. We should spare no efforts to realize this goal. Now the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of Israel, as the only non party to the NPT in the region, and its clandestine nuclear program are the main obstacle to the realization of such a zone in the Middle East. Any efforts to link the establishment of NWFZ in this region with elements, referred to in paragraph 25 of the chairman’s summery, would not help to establish this zone in the region.

I wish also to register that my delegation believes restrictions imposed by ad hoc export control regimes are incompatible with obligations assumed under the NPT. Paragraph 35 as it is worded is less than factual, does not reflect the opposing view and is a departure from previously agreed text. My delegation will attend to them in due course in next PrepCom.

In conclusion, I wish to register the gratitude of my delegation to you, Mr. Chairman, for your effort and for the leadership you demonstrated in guiding our deliberations and bridging the gaps.

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Statement by 

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Statement by 

 Mr. Shahrokh SHAKERIAN

Deputy Director - Department of Disarmament and International Security

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

(Geneva, 6^th May 2003)

NPT 2005 Review Conference - PrepCom II

Cluster 2

1.         The safeguards system of the IAEA is a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. According to Article III of the Treaty, each non-nuclear weapon state party undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under the NPT with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

2.         Article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear weapon states to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.”

3.         The IAEA safeguards system has registered a successful record during the past three decades in preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful use to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Accordingly, the NPT 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed that “IAEA safeguards provide assurances that states parties are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards agreements and assist States in demonstrating this compliance.” Unsubstantiated allegations and restrictions would be a disservice to the goal of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system.

4.         The Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, while recognizing the IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements, reflects the Conference’s conviction that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. It also underlines that concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements should be directed, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusion and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

5.         In the review process of the Treaty, the states parties should adopt concrete measures with the aim to ensure that the rights of all states parties under the provision of the Preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty on the basis of the allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA.

6.         The application of unilaterally enforced export control regimes in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty has hampered the access of the developing countries to nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes. The PrepCom and the NPT 2005 Review Conference should intensify their work in order to promote the implementation of the inalienable rights of all states parties, particularly the developing countries, to enjoy unrestricted access to nuclear materials, technologies, equipment and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.

7.         We stress on the importance of achieving the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system which could reassure prevention of diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses. We reiterate that any international effort to strengthen the comprehensive safeguards would definitely be of much more effect if it considers the universality of the safeguards of the same importance and endeavors to achieve both together.

8.         Israel is the only non party to the NPT in the Middle East region and has not placed its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the Agency. Unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continuation of clandestine nuclear activities of Israel pose the most serious challenges to the peace and security of this region.

9.         The states of the region of the Middle East are deeply concerned about Israel’s access to nuclear material and technologies and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. We call for the total and complete prohibition of transfer of all related equipment, information, material, resources and devices and extension of assistance to states not party to the Treaty without exception in nuclear, scientific or technological fields enabling them to produce or develop nuclear weapons capability.

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Statement by 

 Mr. Mohsen NAZIRI

Director of the Department of Disarmament and International Security

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

(Geneva, 2nd May 2003)  

Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

In The Region of the Middle East

1.    According to the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978 (SSOD1), the establishment of NWFZs has been recognized as an important disarmament measure. Paragraph 61 of this document stipulates that “The Process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons”.

2.    Since the Entry Into Force of the NPT, the establishment of NWFZs throughout the world including Latin America and Caribbean (Tlatelolco), Africa (Pelindaba), South East Asia (Bangkok), Pacific (Rarotonga) and the Central Asia in the near future have been one of  the most important and effective measure in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Above all, NWFZs have made a fundamental contribution to the regional as well as international peace, security and stability, in which states in such zones can pursue sustainable development in a desirable environment.

3.    Following the initiative of Iran in 1974, the proposal to establish a NWFZ in the region of the Middle East has been put on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly since its Twenty-Ninth Session and on the agenda of other international fora, in particular at the General Conference of the IAEA and Review Process of the NPT.

4.    The Resolution on the Middle East, Sponsored by the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as depositories of the NPT, adopted on 11 May 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York, constituted a new impetus to the realization of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Paragraph 4 of this resolution “calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards”.

5.    The 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East and recognized that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.

6.    In spite of the provisions of the sixth paragraph of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East which “Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems”, no concrete step has so far been taken to realize the objective of this resolution. This resolution is, among other related international documents, the manifestation of the legitimate demand by the states of the region.

7.    Israel is the sole non-party to the NPT in the region of the Middle East. Its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and programs in the region are the main obstacle to the realization of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Neglecting the commitment voluntarily undertaken by this important resolution can only embolden Israel to continue to remain as a source of threat and instability in the Middle East by flouting the wish of the international community and remaining outside of the fold of the NPT and fullscope safeguard regime. In this context, we believe that national reports that do not address negative implications of Israel’s intransigence to join NPT, like the one by Australia contained in NPT/CONF.2005/PCII/12 are not as effective as they ought to be in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

8.    Universal adherence to the NPT, especially in this region is the only prerequisite to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Pending the realization of a NWFZ in the region, we firmly believe that no country of the region should develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and they should refrain from action that runs counter to both the letter and spirit of the NPT and other international resolutions and documents relating to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

9.    The Islamic Republic of Iran, being a party to all international instruments on weapons of mass destruction, namely NPT, CWC, BTWC and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, has fully supported and actively sought the realization of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East.

10.  The NPT Review PrepComs and Conferences have a significant role in realization of such zone in the Middle East. At this crucial juncture, the Second PrepCom for the NPT Review Conference in 2005 should introduce ways and means in terms of concrete recommendations for urgent and practical steps for the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the NPT 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

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Working Paper Submitted by

Islamic Republic of Iran

To the NPT 2005 Review Conference - PrepCom II

on

Negative Security Assurances

1.       The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978 stipulates that “All states, in particular nuclear-weapons States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon states, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security”.

2.       The NPT 2000 Review Conference concluded that “Legally binding security assurances by the five Nuclear Weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime…” The Conference also “call[ed] upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue”.

3.       Since the NPT 1995 Review and Extension Conference no practical and serious steps have been taken to assure NNWSs parties to the treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Given the reaffirmation of the 2000 NPT Review Conference on the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and the call by Conference upon the PrepCom to make recommendations to the NPT 2005 Review Conference on this issue, the NNWSs genuinely expect this session to provide substantial recommendations in this regard.

4.     The new doctrine of a certain nuclear weapon state
(The so called Nuclear Posture Review) based on the possible use of nuclear weapons, even in a conventional conflict, along with plans to develop new generations of such weaponry not only undermines the non-proliferation regime, but also is a violation of international commitments of NWSs and the unilateral declarations of a certain nuclear weapon state on negative security assurances.

5.       The mentality of the cold war and the role of nuclear weapons in the doctrines of NWSs, the current deadlock on the Conference on Disarmament and the lack of negotiation on a legally binding instrument to address this concern, and above all the increasing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, have created a new fragile environment in which NNWSs are in dire need of acquiring negative security assurances.

6.       Total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and pending the total elimination of these inhuman weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs) should be pursued as a matter of priority by the international community.

In line with the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, Iran would like to present the following recommendations in order to stipulate further discussions on recommendations that the preparatory committee meeting could submit to the 2005 Review Conference.

I.       In the post cold war era and pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, the NWSs should undertake unconditional and unqualified commitments so as not to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs parties to the NPT.

II.      In light of the new developments in the international security arena, a new resolution from the UN Security Council underlining unqualified security assurances on use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, would enhance regional and international peace and security.

III.     An Ad Hoc Committee should be established in the Conference on Disarmament with the mandate to negotiate on an effective, universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

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Statement by 

H. E. Mr. Amir H. Zamaninia

Director General for International Political Affairs

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

(Geneva, 1^th MAy 2003)

PrepCom II - NPT 2005 Review Conference

Cluster I

          During the Cold War the threat of nuclear war and proliferation of nuclear weapons overwhelmed the international security environment as a result of increasing rivalries between the two superpowers. Aware of the great dangers of the proliferation of such horrible weapons, the international community could not but go along with a policy of two steps forward and one step back, and accept the creation of a small club of nuclear weapon states in order to curb the danger of further horizontal proliferation and prevent the increase in the number of nuclear powers. Clearly this was just a phase in the process of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT clearly foresaw undertakings “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.

          Article VI is a main pillar of the NPT and the key element in order to understand the nature and characteristics of mutual obligations under the Treaty. This Article clearly underlines that the NPT was not intended to grant a permanent and everlasting special status to nuclear weapon states. This Article is a directing principle of the NPT through which the way to achieve nuclear disarmament under effective and strict international control has been demonstrated. And this Article is an essential and integral part of the decision made by the international community to extend indefinitely the NPT in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

          By adoption of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and the related paragraphs of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear and Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, including the “unequivocal undertaking of nuclear powers to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals”, the 2000 Review Conference created fresh hopes that the collective efforts of the international community are moving forward in the right direction.  However, a quick look at the overall implementation of the 13 steps over the past three years shows that there have only been setbacks and negative developments.

          The President of the only nuclear weapon state rejecting the CTBT in its legislative branch is very explicit in announcing that he does not intend to resubmit it to the senate in his term (Fate of Step 1).

          The same nuclear weapon state is vigorously following a program to drastically reduce the amount of time required to prepare for resumption of full-scale underground nuclear testing (Fate of Step 2).

          The Conference on Disarmament has not yet succeeded in agreeing on a program of work, let alone including a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty in its agenda (Fate of Step 3) or establishing a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament (Fate of Step 4).

          Manufacturing of nuclear weapon components and The New Posture Review prescribing the manufacturing of new types of nuclear weapons are vivid example of repudiation of the principle of irreversibility (Fate of Step 5).

          Three years might be too short to expect the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. However, it is also too short to forget their unequivocal undertaking, or even in some cases, even the pronunciation of the word unequivocal (Fate of Step 6).

          The ABM is abrogated through the unilateral withdrawal of the United States and Start II and Start III processes are practically terminated (Fate of Step 7).

          The Trilateral Initiative is still to be completed and implemented. Regrettably, thus far less than 1 percent of the excess weapons-grade material is under IAEA control (Fate of Step 8).

          Nuclear weapons are no longer relied on as a mere deterrent factor in superpower rivalries. As the US Nuclear Posture Review and its National Security Strategy prescribes, they are to be conveniently used against nuclear and non-nuclear states parties to the NPT alike and the threshold of using them is lowered to conventional conflicts (Fate of Step 9).

          No excess fissile material has so far been put under IAEA or other relevant international verification and there does not seem to exist any such intention in nuclear weapons states (Fate of Step 10).

          Step 11 seems to be the easiest one to claim success. Every nuclear weapon states may conveniently claim that the ultimate objective of its efforts in disarmament process is general and complete disarmament. However the concern is that there has not been any effort to evaluate its ultimate objective, under effective international control.

          Bearing all that in mind one might have every right to wonder what remains to report upon. Non-nuclear states continue sincerely to aspire for a world free from nuclear weapons. Therefore, many have reported on their perseverance in seeking the fulfillment of the nuclear weapon states’ obligation under Article VI. Nuclear Weapon States have special responsibilities to meet and to report on them. It is in fact the reports of nuclear weapon states which could help us all in this room to have a better idea of where we are standing in our path towards nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

          When the 13 steps were adopted in 2000 in New York, all members of international community but four were represented, very much similar to the situation we have here today. We believe the 13 steps have been too dire to us here to let it be so easily put aside and overlooked. The NPT Review Process should substantially deal with the implementation of the thirteen steps.

          The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates the global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon states at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

          We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as the highest priority and as soon as possible of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

          During the 2000 Review Conference, nuclear weapon states committed themselves to "the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process". Despite their commitments, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states. We fully support the initiative taken by Austria, Mexico and Sweden and consider the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons as part and parcel of the drive for nuclear disarmament.

          The nuclear weapon states should engage immediately and in good faith in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of their obligations under the Treaty, in particular Article VI and the commitments under the 1995 decision on principles and objectives and the resolution on the Middle East. Any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.

The Nuclear Weapon States should comply with their commitments to the full implementation of Article I. They should refrain from nuclear sharing, under any kind of security arrangements among themselves with non-nuclear weapon states, and those not party to the Treaty.

We emphasize the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty without exception and in particular to Israel, whose unsafegaurded nuclear facilities pose a great threat to the security and stability in the Middle East.

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Statement by 

H. E. Mr. G. Ali Khoshroo

Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and

International Affairs of the

Islamic Republic of Iran

Before the

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(Geneva, 29^th April 2003)

Mr. Chairman,

            Let me congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this second preparatory committee of the NPT 2005 Review Conference. I am sure that your diplomatic skills and experience will best guide our discussions towards the contributions to the recommendations of the third preparatory committee.

Mr. Chairman,

            While fully associating with the statement delivered by the distinguished ambassador of Malaysia on behalf of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement parties to the NPT, I would like to make the following statement.

            Since we met last year there have been several positive and negative developments worth taking note of. The most welcome event has been the decision by Cuba to become a State Party to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty. We also welcome the endeavours of the five central Asian States to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in that region and hope these events will harbinger the total universality of the Treaty and the establishment of a nuclear weapon - or rather weapons of mass destruction - free zone in the Middle East. On the other hand we also had the decision by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT. We hope the dialogue initiated in Beijing will provide the opportunity to have DPRK within the NPT family again.

Mr. Chairman,

            The mandate of the second Prepcom, as part of the review process of the NPT, is to consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions and the Resolution adopted in 1995 and the outcomes of the subsequent Review Conferences including developments affecting the operation and purposes of the treaty as well as, of course, procedural issues. This will provide us with another opportunity to deal with international security policy and focus on the role of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in enhancing international peace and security. 

            Due to critical developments which have occurred during the past two years, the international security environment has gone through deep changes and new formidable challenges have emerged, which need to be addressed. Chief among them is the militarization of this environment. While we were optimistic that military elements would find a diminishing role in the security policy of states, the events following 9/11 including the military operation in Afghanistan, have expanded the presence of foreign military forces in some sensitive areas of the world, particularly in the Persian Gulf region.  Such events together with the most important one, the recent war in Iraq have undermined that optimism and led to an unprecedented militarization of the international security environment in recent years. Today, we are concerned that the predominance of the military element over the international security environment may undermine, if not ruin, the achievements of the 1990’s that focused on international standard setting in a multilateral context. The negative repercussions of this challenge for the international system are of great concern particularly in this climate of seemingly convenient unilateralism.

            A very historical proven fact is that while militarization is becoming predominant over international relations, the threat posed by the existence, acquiring and accumulation of nuclear weapons to the very foundation of peaceful relations among nations will increase more than ever. During the time characterized by militarization, the need to stick to the principle of disarmament and arms control and to protect the past achievements is more important than ever. In such a climate, the consequences of any negative developments and setbacks in achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament will severely threaten peace and stability in the world.

            The international community still considers the existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use as the most serious threat to the very existence of humankind and civilisation, however some developments and setbacks have occurred since the 2000 Review Conference and the last Prepcom. The emergence of a new security doctrine that set rationale for possible use of nuclear weapons is among those developments. This doctrine relies on nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, as a key element in the national security strategy of a nuclear power. The new approaches towards nuclear weapons stress capabilities to respond to conventional and non-nuclear threats, which should serve as a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with the security interest of that nuclear power. Ignoring the widespread protest against its nuclear doctrines, in its National Security Strategy released in September 2002, it asserts that it “has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat” to its national security and that it will, if necessary, act pre-emptively “to forestall or prevent hostile acts by its adversaries”. Furthermore, the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles defence systems, the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space and the unilateral withdrawal from the ABM, have intensified the further militarization of the international security environment, threaten the strategic stability in the world and put the arms control and disarmament efforts at peril.

            It is time to stick to the principles of disarmament and to protect past collective achievements. We, as a matter of principle, are strongly of the view that the only way to counter challenges that emanate from the existence of nuclear arsenals of the nuclear powers and the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to strengthen the relevant international instruments through multilateral, comprehensive and non-discriminatory efforts. We firmly believe that the NPT is the cornerstone of the international efforts to achieve complete nuclear disarmament and to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of this horrible weapon.

            Scrutiny of the non-proliferation record of the NPT substantiates the assertion that the Treaty has a successful record in halting proliferation of nuclear weapons. During the past three decades of its existence only two cases of non-compliance have been registered to this effect. In other words, the credit goes to non-nuclear weapon state parties that have stuck to the principles and objectives of the NPT and complied with the obligation of not acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and, as a result, enabling the NPT to register such a successful record in the field of non-proliferation.

            On the contrary, due to the reluctance of some nuclear weapon states, the disarmament objectives of the NPT have not materialized in spite of their clear obligations and the continuous calls of the international community. Nuclear disarmament is still the highest priority in the security agenda of the international community. A review of the past shows a lack of progress by the nuclear powers to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

            By the adoption of 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and the related paragraph of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear and non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, including an unequivocal undertaking of nuclear powers to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the 2000 Review Conference gave fresh hope that the collective efforts of the international community were moving forward in the right direction.  However, the actions and measures taken by the nuclear powers were far from the expectation of the international community that the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfilment of the noble goal of nuclear disarmament. The picture of nuclear disarmament over the past two years has been one of setbacks and negative developments.

            The current Prepcom should substantially deal with nuclear disarmament to find the best way to materialize the welcomed outcomes of the 2000 Review conference and in particular the parts related to nuclear disarmament. In the light of the current developments the convening of an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear danger, as requested by our Heads of States and Governments in the United Nations Millennium Declaration will bring us one step closer to achieving nuclear disarmament.

            Realizing the universality of the NPT is an urgent need to enhance security and stability in the world. In light of the current developments, the Middle East, as one of the most sensitive areas, deserves more attention and substantial work during the current meeting. We vividly recall that the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was an integral part of the decision for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Now the sole obstacle for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region is Israel, which has not yet joined the NPT and has not placed its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the IAEA. All members of the NPT and specifically those who have influence on this regime should exert far more pressure on it to join the NPT and renounce its security policy based on WMD and in particular nuclear weapons.

            Article IV has a critical role to play in full and indiscriminate implementation of the NPT. Its goal is to strike a balance between the security concerns and the socio-economic requirements for development especially for the developing countries. By establishing a framework to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, through enhancing international cooperation among state parties, it provides the main incentive set forth in the treaty.  Considering the experience with Iraq concerning its circumvention of the rules of the NPT and IAEA safeguards, we do recognize that keeping such balance is a challenge. However, stressing only the security aspect of disarmament treaties including the NPT, and hampering the materialization of recognized inalienable rights of state parties to engage in peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be a disservice to the principles and objectives of the Treaty.

            The NPT constitutes an integrated structure, whose effectiveness and realizations of its noble goals lie in full compliance with all its provisions by all Parties. The credibility of the NPT as the most encompassing disarmament treaty would be impaired through selective and discriminatory approaches towards its implementation.

            Let me also recall that the security of peaceful nuclear facilities has been guaranteed through the NPT 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision on Principles and Objectives. The package of decisions and resolutions adopted in 1995 do form an integral part of the package leading to the indefinite extension of NPT. Any use or threat of use of force against peaceful nuclear facilities of members of the NPT, would “jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”. We believe the Review Process should also duly engage with all aspects of peaceful use of nuclear energy and security of peaceful facilities under the IAEA safeguards.

Mr. Chairman,

            The NPT 2000 Review Conference concluded that “Legally binding security assurances by the five Nuclear Weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime…”

            Since there is seemingly a long way, due to the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, to the total elimination of such horrible weapons, providing security assurances to Non-Nuclear State Parties to the NPT, by nuclear powers, against any uses or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a crucial step toward the strengthening of the Treaty. Therefore, the Prepcom should also focus on this matter and highlight the necessity of the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument warranting such assurances.

            The IAEA safeguards system is a main pillar of the NPT’s non-proliferation regime. The 2000 Review Conference considered that the comprehensive safeguards provide assurances that states are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards agreements. The Conference has also stressed the consolidation and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards as a main objective for the non-proliferation regime. The achievement of the universality of the comprehensive safeguards, in particular in the sensitive areas of the world, should be considered as the most urgent need for consolidation of the NPT’s structure and security of non-nuclear weapon parties. Any international effort to strengthen the comprehensive safeguards would definitely be of much more effect if it considers the universality of the safeguards of the same importance and endeavours to achieve both together. 

Mr. Chairman,

            Before concluding I would like to say a few words with respect to some references made to my country’s peaceful nuclear program.

Iran as a founding member of the NPT is more than fully committed to all its obligations under the Treaty and is in the meantime determined to vigorously exploit its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

            In its attempt to develop its indigenous peaceful nuclear capability Iran has been in constant cooperation with the IAEA and has fully complied with its obligations under its safeguards agreements. This cooperation has advanced in parallel with the progress in developing our national peaceful capabilities. The IAEA is fully briefed of our long term plans.

            Let me reiterate here in a solemn way that, unlike some others, we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our very basic principles.  They have no place in Iran’s defence doctrine.  They do not add to our security nor do they help us to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in our supreme interests. We have no hidden agenda and do not seek nuclear weapons, and most certainly we do not accept or tolerate allegations by those who have clearly placed themselves outside the law.

            Iranians know that more capability necessarily prompts more responsibility. We would prove that accountability is part and parcel of our quest for full nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. We are enforcing our national laws and regulations on the control of nuclear and radioactive material and equipments. We welcome any constructive interaction with other parties including the Nuclear Supplier Group.

            The NPT 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed that “IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” and we believe that the IAEA provides the only appropriate mechanism to address any possible question or concern.

            In reaction to the report recently submitted by the Director General of the IAEA, questions have been raised on detailed aspects of the Iranian peaceful projects at the Board of Governors. The DG is to report back in June. In the meantime we are providing substantiated information in great detail and with complete transparency to address the questions in order to reassure those states, who have raised them in good faith, of our full compliance.

We cannot however convince those who have other agendas in bringing subjects relevant to the IAEA, to this body. Are they trying to promote the NPT regime through undermining the NPT apparatus, which is designed to look into questions regarding compliance and which in fact at this very time is conducting its task? What is the real reason to distort the needed focus of the NPT Prepcom from its main duty?

            Let me ask some concrete questions: How many nuclear weapon states other than the United States have prescribed the use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts and developed new types of nuclear weapons compatible with its combat scenarios? None. Which other nuclear weapon states have named non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT as the targets of their nuclear weapons? None. Which other nuclear weapon states have sought to utilize outer space for nuclear purposes more than the Unites States? None. How many Nuclear Weapon States other than the United States have legislatively rejected the CTBT and practically doomed its future? Why did the United States through its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM and its abrogation of step 7 of the 13 steps threaten the strategic stability of the world? Which NPT party other than the United States has left such a record of undermining so many international instruments, on disarmament and other issues alike? None.

            Are these not the relevant questions that should be dealt with at this Prepcom and other NPT meetings?

Let’s be examples for others by deeds, not words and polemic.

            I thank you Mr. Chairman.

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